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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
RULE 60(b) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 60(b). Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. 
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; . . . (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reason[ ] (1) . 
. . not more that 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. 
RULE 11(e) UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 11(e). The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to 
appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing 
the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a transcript of 
such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems 
necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within the same period, a copy 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate court. 
If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period 
the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court 
and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the 
proceedings were otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court 
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Judicial 
Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by the 
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appellate court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may transcribe 
a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate court shall, upon request, provide 
a list of all certified court transcribers. The transcriber is subject to all of the 
obligations imposed on reporters by these rules. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding 
or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On May 8, 1992, an action was filed by Leon and Arlene Robinson (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the "Robinson's") against Kay Gneiting, Kerry Rick Hubble and 
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Hubble Plaintiffs") 
relative to a real property transaction in Summit County. (R. 2-10). 
2. In turn, the Hubble Plaintiffs filed a counterclaim against Defendant Dennis Vance 
(hereinafter referred to as "Vance"), the Appellant in this Appeal, seeking damages and 
indemnification resulting from Vance's initiation of a fraudulent scheme carried out without their 
knowledge. (R. 12-29). 
3. On June 1, 1994, a trial was held in the Third District Court on the Hubble 
Plaintiffs' counterclaim against Defendant Dennis Vance. (R. 429). 
4. The trial court ruled in favor of the Hubble Plaintiffs and against Defendant 
Dennis Vance, and entered its initial order orally during a telephone conference call on August 
18, 1994. (R. 478). 
5. The trial court's oral ruling was reduced to a written order and entered with the 
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clerk of the Third District Court on October 20, 1994. (See Judgment attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A"). (R. 420-422). 
6. On or about October 20, 1994, Defendant Vance filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, and specifically indicated that the Motion was based on Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (See Motion to Set Aside Judgment attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). (R. 
410-411). 
7. In response to the Vance Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
the Hubble Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Response to Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Countermotion for Compensatory Damages. (See 
Memorandum and Countermotion attached hereto as Exhibit "C"). (R. 431-435). 
8. Defendant Vance thereafter filed a document with the trial court entitled, Third-
Party Defendant's Response to Third-Party Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Compensatory 
Damages. (R. 473-476). 
9. On January 13, 1995, the trial court heard extensive oral argument on Defendant 
Vance's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment and the Hubble Plaintiffs' Countermotion for 
Compensatory Damages. (R. 572). 
10. Ruling from the bench on January 13, 1995, the trial court denied Defendant 
Vance's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and granted the Hubble Plaintiffs' Countermotion for 
Compensatory Damages. A written Order to that effect was entered by the Court on January 
24, 1995. Although Vance has failed to secure a transcript or record of those proceedings, 
Judge Homer Wilkinson indicated on the record and in open court that it was his original 
intention that Vance be responsible for compensatory damages related to the earlier judgment, 
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particularly when the Court considered Vance's orchestration and furtherance of a scheme to 
defraud the Plaintiffs (See Order Denying Vance's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Granting 
Third-Party Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Compensatory Damages attached hereto as Exhibit 
"D"). (R. 588-590). 
11. On March 13, 1995, the Court entered Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Judgment incorporating the compensatory damages in 
favor of the Hubble Plaintiffs. (R. 661-673). 
12. On April 11, 1995, Vance filed his Notice of Appeal from the trial court's 
judgment. (R. 682-683). 
13. Vance's Brief on Appeal was due on or before July 17, 1995. Apparently, Vance 
was granted an initial extension of time by the court clerk to file his brief no later than August 
10, 1995. 
14. On August 8, 1995, Vance's attorney, although claiming not yet to have been 
retained by Vance to represent his interest on appeal, filed a motion on behalf of Vance seeking 
a second extension to September 15, 1995 in which to file a brief. 
15. In the second Motion for Enlargement of Time, Vance's counsel stated that Vance 
had previously discussed getting a copy of the trial transcript with the court reporter, but that 
he did not engage the court reporter to actually prepare the transcript until ten days prior to 
August 8, 19951. 
16. On August 10, 1995, Appellees filed an objection to the second Motion for 
Enlargement of Time. 
1
 Ten days prior to August 8, 1995 would have been Sunday, July 30, 1995. 
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17. On August 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals entered an Order denying the 
Appellant's second Motion for Enlargement of Time. In the Order, the Court held as follows: 
The motion for enlargement of time alleges that additional time is needed 
to file appellant's brief because the transcript is not completed. Despite, Mr. 
Dingivan's representation that the transcript has been requested, this court has 
not received a copy of such request as required under Rule 11(e)(1), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, nor has the court reporter filed an acknowledgement of 
the request as required under Rule 12(a)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The court questions the authority of counsel to file the motion for 
enlargement since they have not been retained by appellant to represent him in 
the appeal. Additionally, the court is concerned with appellant's consistent 
failure to comply with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure in pursuing this appeal. 
Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that the Motion for Enlargement of 
time is denied. 
(A true and correct copy of the Court of Appeals' Order is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"E".) 
18. Appellant failed to timely file his brief before the August 10, 1995 deadline as 
ordered by the Court. 
19. The Hubble Plaintiffs filed a Rule 26(c) Motion to Dismiss the Vance Appeal 
which was denied on September 19, 1995. 
20. The record before the Court of Appeals is still incomplete. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly had jurisdiction to correct its October 20, 1994 judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Amended 
Judgment entered on March 13, 1995 must be upheld. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION AND 
PROPERLY CONSIDERED VANCE'S RULE 60(b) 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND THE 
HUBBLE/WILDERNESS BUSINESS SYSTEMS' 
COUNTERMOTION FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
On October 20, 1994, the trial court entered its original judgment against Vance and in 
favor of the Hubble Plaintiffs. Vance filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment citing 
specifically to Rule 60(b) as the basis of his motion. Vance argued that because the trial court 
awarded punitive damages against him without reference to compensatory damages, the judgment 
should be set aside. 
The Hubble Plaintiffs timely filed their Memorandum in Response to the Vance Rule 
60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Countermotion for Compensatory Damages. In 
essence, the parties each sought the trial court's correction to the original judgment to address 
their respective concerns about the issue of compensatory damages. In reply to the Rule 60(b) 
Countermotion for Compensatory Damages, Vance filed his Response to Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Countermotion for Compensatory Damages. 
The trial court heard oral argument on both Rule 60(b) Motions on January 13, 1995. 
The court denied Vance's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and granted the Countermotion of 
the Hubble Plaintiffs for Compensatory Damages. The court specifically stated as part of its 
ruling that it had intended that Vance be responsible for compensatory damages related to the 
earlier judgment, particularly when the court considered Vance's orchestration and furtherance 
of a scheme to defraud the Plaintiffs. 
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Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for relief from a final 
judgment: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reason[ ] (1) . . . not more that 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is the unquestioned prerogative of the trial court, either upon its own motion, or upon 
application of a party, to change or correct any order which it judges to have been entered 
incorrectly when it acts timely and within the provisions of the rule governing such changes or 
corrections of orders. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah 
App. 1991); Rees v. Albertsons Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 131-132 (Utah 1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in the Rees v. Albertsons, Inc., supra, case 
as follows: 
Considerable tempest has been engendered in this case because the trial court 
first denied a motion for summary judgment made by the defendant, but upon 
subsequent proceedings decided to vacate that order, then reconsidered and 
granted defendant's motion. It would serve no useful purpose to go into any 
extended detail as to the proceedings. It is sufficient to say that it is the 
unquestioned prerogative of the court, either upon its own motion, or upon the 
application of a party, to change or correct any order which it judges to have 
been entered by "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" as 
provided by Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. when it acts timely and within the provisions 
of that rule. The actions of the court were within that prerogative.2 587 P.2d 
at 131-132. 
2See 60 CJ.S. Motions & Orders § 62(1); Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 299 
P.2d 827 (1956); Drurv v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966); Luke v. Coleman, 
38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023 (1911). 
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Similarly, in the 1993 Utah Court of Appeals decision in Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 
270 (Utah App. 1993), this Court addressed the propriety of a motion filed within the trial court 
by Appellee to obtain relief from an incorrect judgment. The Appellants in that case also joined 
in the motion requesting similar relief on their behalf. The Court of Appeals held that: 
. . . Appellees' Motion to "clarify" the trial court's original order allowed the 
trial court to change the deficient judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b). 
Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993) 
The Court based its ruling on the language found in Rule 60(b) which provides in 
pertinent part that "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons . . . (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time . . . " Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b); 855 P.2d at 273. 
In the Kunzler v. O'Dell, supra, case, the Court went on to point out that the title of a 
motion is not dispositive as to whether a court can grant relief under that motion. When the 
substance of a mislabeled motion is in essence the same as a motion under Rule 60(b), courts 
can use the rule to grant relief.3 855 P.2d at 274. See also Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah 
App. 1991) (the court did not elevate form over substance by refusing to allow a timely objection 
to a judgment invoking Rule 60(b) relief). 
3The Court of Appeals has further held that correcting its judgment is one manner of relief 
available the trial court. Seet e.g., Baker v. Western Stir, Co., 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 
1988). 
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It is well settled that Courts should give liberal construction to Rule 60(b). 7 James W. 
Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice 1 60.18[8], at 60-138 to -139 (2d ed. 1992) (footnote 
omitted). Because "nomenclature is unimportant, moving papers that are mislabeled in other 
ways may be treated as motions under Rule 60(b) when relief would be proper under that rule." 
Id. A Court may grant relief under subsection seven of Rule 60(b) for any reason other than 
the first six enumerated by the rule if relief is justified, and the motion is made within a 
reasonable time. Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 
P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991). The precedent of law in Utah further grants to the trial court 
jurisdiction to consider Rule 60(b) motions even where an appeal is pending. White v. State, 
795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990); Baker v. Western Sur. Co.. 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988). In 
White v. State, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[U]nder Rule 60(b) the district court 
has the power to relieve a party of a judgment even though it may be a final judgment.4 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a 60(b) motion will not be overturned absent 
a clear abuse of "discretion." Fackrell v. FackrelL 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987), as cited 
in Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988). More recently, this Court 
has held that "We will not interfere with the trial court's broad discretion to rule on a 60(b) 
motion absent a showing of abuse of that discretion." Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 
(Utah App. 1989) as cited in Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons. Co.. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah 
App. 1991); Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
4Indeed, it has been observed that the rule provides a "nice balance between the interest in 
finality [of judgments], and the desire to achieve justice." Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Practice 
and Procedure. § 2872 (1973). 
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The trial court's correction of the judgment to include compensatory damages was proper 
and within the jurisdictional purview of the court under Rule 60(b). The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it corrected the judgment to include compensatory damages against 
Vance, and the Amended Judgment must be affirmed. 
II. 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO SECURE A TRANSCRIPT 
AND RECORD OF THE TRIAL COURT'S PROCEEDINGS 
REQUIRE THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT BE AFFIRMED AND UPHELD 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that, "[i]f the appellant 
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion." Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989); Bevan v. J.H. 
Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983) (in the absence of a transcript, the Court must 
presume the trial proceedings were proper and judgment was supported by the evidence); Utah 
R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
As the Appellant, Vance, has the burden of providing the Court of Appeals with an 
adequate record from the trial court for review. Jacobs v. Hafen. 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 
1994); Mark VII Fin. Consultants. Corp. v. Smedlev, 792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah App. 1990); 
Onveaber v. Pro Roofing. Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
Vance further has the responsibility to marshal all of the evidence that supports the trial court's 
findings and conclusions of law, and must demonstrate that despite the evidence, the findings 
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and conclusions are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence." 
In re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Vance has failed to provide the Court with a transcript of the proceedings below. 
Without all of the relevant evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal, as required by Utah 
R. App. P. 11(e)(2), "we [the Court of Appeals] can only presume that the judgment was 
supported by sufficient evidence." Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah 
App. 1990); State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 217 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Without an appropriate record and transcript of the proceedings which took place before 
the trial court, not only during the June 1, 1994 trial, but at the January 13, 1995 hearing on 
the Rule 60(b) motions, the only presumption that can be made is that the trial proceedings were 
proper and judgment appropriately entered. 
Ill 
VANCE IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING AN 
OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
This Court has consistently refused to consider arguments raised by Appellants for the 
first time on appeal. "Appellants cannot assert new grounds for their motion for the first time 
on appeal without having afforded the trial court an opportunity to rule on those grounds or to 
correct any alleged deficiency." Meyer ex rel. Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 
1984); Atkins v. Household Finance Corp.. 581 P.2d 193 (1978) as cited in Katz v. Pierce. 732 
P.2d 92, 95-96 (Utah 1986); (See also, Richins v. Delbert v. Chipman & Sons Co.. Inc.. supra. 
11 
817 P.2d at 387). 
The very crux of Vance's argument on appeal is that the trial court did not have the 
authority to amend its October 20, 1994 judgment. (See Brief of Appellant Point I). The basis 
cited by Vance for this proposition focuses on a fallacious assumption that the trial court 
improperly amended its original judgment after the Rule 52 and Rule 59 ten day bar date. 
It is interesting to note, however, that when the Hubble Plaintiffs filed their 
Memorandum in Response to Third-Party Defendant Vance's Rule 60(b) Motion and 
Countermotion for Compensatory Damages on November 1, 1994, Vance nor his counsel ever 
objected to or challenged the trial court's authority to consider the Rule 60(b) Countermotion. 
In fact, rather than raise the issue, Vance merely argued in his Reply to the Countermotion that 
the Court had already considered the Hubble Plaintiffs' Countermotion arguments. Vance's own 
Docketing Statement filed in the Court of Appeals does not even support this belated challenge 
of the trial court's action. 
The vulnerability of Vance's argument that the trial court had no authority to correct or 
amend its October 20, 1994 judgment, improperly raised here for the first time on appeal, is 
additional, if necessary, support for the premise that the decision of the trial court must be 
affirmed. 
IV. 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH OTHER 
ASPECTS OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
PROVIDE, IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL CAUSE NOT 
TO DISTURB THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
Rule 26(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states as follows: 
(c) Consequence of failure to file brief. If an appellant fails to file 
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a brief within the time provided in this rule, or within the time as may be 
extended by order of the appellate court, an appellee may move for dismissal of 
the appeal. . . 
Rule 26(c) U.R.A.P. 
Appellant Vance was previously granted an extension to file his brief in this appeal no 
later than August 10, 1995. He thereafter filed a second motion for another extension of time 
to file his brief on or before September 15, 1995. The Court, after considering all of the 
circumstances surrounding the Appellant's request for a second extension of time, denied the 
request. (See Exhibit "E" Court of Appeals' Order entered August 18, J995). 
In his second Motion for Enlargement of Time, Appellant represented that he had made 
arrangements with the court reporter for a transcript ten days prior to filing the second Motion 
for Enlargement of Time. In its ruling on Appellant's motion, the Court, however, pointed out 
that despite counsel for Appellant's representation that additional time was needed to file the 
brief because the transcript was not yet complete and that the transcript had been requested, the 
Court of Appeals has never received a copy of such a request as required under Rule 11(e)(1), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, nor has the court reporter filed an acknowledgement of the 
request as required under Rule 12(a)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See Exhibit "E" 
Court of Appeals' Order entered August 18, 1995). 
In denying Appellant's second request for an enlargement of time, this Court 
appropriately pointed out that "...[t]he court is concerned with appellant's consistent failure 
to comply with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in pursuing this 
appeal,ff Id. 
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All litigants have a right to rely on the precise language of a court order. Of course the 
rules provide relief, namely a procedure for timely seeking appropriate extensions when there 
is just and good cause. A failure to properly avail oneself of that procedure is an intentional and 
voluntary waiver of any right to that relief. The rules are grounded in fairness - carefully 
articulated to protect all litigants. When the rules are ignored, the result is unfairness to those 
litigants who comply. 
Throughout this appeal, Appellant Vance has failed to comply with the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, neglected to request the transcript, and has disregarded the filing due date 
for his brief. Allowing Vance to submit his brief beyond the court-ordered deadline and in 
violation of the Court of Appeals' August 18, 1995 Order flaunts the rules and orders of this 
Court and makes a mockery of fairness and justice to the other litigants. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court properly corrected its October 20, 1994 Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
U.R.C.P. Moreover, because Appellant Vance has failed to provide the Court of Appeals an 
appropriate record of the proceedings below as required by Rule 11(e) U.R.A.P.; has 
inappropriately challenged the trial court's action in correcting the judgment for the first time 
14 
on appeal; and based upon the other reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial court must 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this lo day of October, 
CHRISTIANSEN &SQNNTAG 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellees by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this | 0 day of 
October, 1995, and properly addressed as follows: 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (#2948) 
LAWRENCE R. DINGIVAN (#5193) 
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS 
215 South State Street, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-y hiUft £ik 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN of 
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG 
345 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple \ W.'tt. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
RL5D 5!ST!?fTC«rjPJ 
Thi.-o J-jcii..- • District 
OCT 2 0 1994 
i i ? j -~ 
n>.--',H:f>< 4 \ _ 
Dapc.y Clerk 
Attorneys for Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and 
ARLENE ROBINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS VANCE, 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920902754 
Judge Homer'F. Wilkinson 
Third Party Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly before the Court for a non-jury trial on the Third-Party 
Complaint filed by Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, against Third-Party 
Defendant, Dennis Vance, on June 1, 1994, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District 
Court Judge, presiding; and was again before the court for a hearing on Third-Party Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Clarification of Judgment Against Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance on September 
23, 1994. Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag, appeared on behalf 
of the Third-Party Plaintiffs, Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. Scott 
Mitchell of the law firm of Lehman, Mitchell & Waldo, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs, 
Leon and Arlene Robinson (hereinafter "Robinsons"). Dennis Vance, Third-Party Defendant, 
appeared pro se. The parties having adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary 
exhibits, and having argued the matter to the Court, and the Court having reviewed the file, 
exhibits, and memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the Court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing therefore, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment upon the merits be entered 
in favor of the Third-Party Plaintiffs Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., 
and against Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance, in the amount of $24,780.56, together with 
interest thereon as allowed by Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-4. 
DATED this^ * day of October, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
- 7 ^ - T^hz^^- - _ 
/ Homer F. Wilkinson 
/ District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this b> day of 
October, 1994, and properly addressed as follows: 
Scott B. Mitchell 
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO 
An Association of Sole Proprietorships 
Kearns Building, Suite 721 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dennis Vance 
7702 West 13090 South 
Herriman, Utah 84065 
^SUync/, ^ddls 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Michael G. Barker (6475) 
MICHAEL G. BARKER, P.C. 
56 E. Broadway, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-3334 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and 
ARLENE ROBINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants, 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation/ 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS VANCE, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920902754 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
COMES NOW Third-Party Defendant, by and through counsel, and 
moves the Court for an order setting aside the judgment for 
punitive damages entered against Third-Party Defendant in favor 
of Third-Party Plaintiffs. This motion is based on Rule 
60(b)(1), (5) of the Utah R. Civ. Pro. and is supported by the 
004in 
accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 
DATED this / / day of October, 1994. 
MICHAEL G. BARKER, P.C, 
Michael G. Barker 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTTFTCATE OF MAILING 
day of October, 1994 I 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment to the following attorneys of 
record: 
Kent L. Christiansen, Esq. 
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG 
345 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Scott B. Mitchell, Esq. 
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO 
Kearns Building, Suite 721 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
FILED 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN of 
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG 
345 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and 
ARLENE ROBINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS VANCE, 
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS, 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT 
DENNIS VANCE'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
AND COUNTERMOTION FOR 
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
Civil No. 920902754 
> 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Third Party Defendant. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Kerry Rick Hubble, and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, by and through their attorney, Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm 
Christiansen & Sonntag, and pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, hereby responds to the Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine Vance's Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment, and submits this Countermotion requesting that this honorable court enter 
judgment for compensatory damages against Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance in conjunction 
with the award for punitive damages previously entered in this matter. In response to Vance's 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, and in support of their Countermotion, said Third-party 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit as follows: 
1. A trial was held on the Third-Party Complaint against Dennis Vance on June 1, 
1994. At the close of that trial, and pursuant to the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs requested that the court enter judgment against Third-Party Defendant 
Vance in the amount of $24,780.56 compensatory damages, together with pre-judgment interest 
in the amount of $16,583.97, plus interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent from April 21, 
1993—the same amount the court awarded the Robinsons against Defendants and Third-Party 
Plaintiffs Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems. Third-Party Plaintiffs also sought an award 
of damages on their conversion claim in the amount of $9,800.00, plus punitive damages against 
Defendant Vance. 
2. As a result of the evidence presented at trial, the court granted Third-Party 
Plaintiffs judgment for punitive damages against Dennis Vance in the amount of $24,780.56. 
No amount for compensatory damages was included in the judgment. 
3. The evidence supports the fact, and the court so found, that Third-Party Plaintiffs 
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were damaged by the willful and malicious acts of Dennis Vance. As a direct and proximate 
result of Vance's actions, Third-Party Plaintiffs have been damaged in that judgment was entered 
against them and in favor of the Plaintiffs for compensatory damages totalling $41,364.53 plus 
interest at twelve percent (12%) from April 21, 1993. 
4, Movants herein respectfully submit that in addition to the award for punitive 
damages, they are entitled to compensatory damages against Third-Party Defendant Vance, and 
that existing law dictates that compensatory damages be awarded incident to an award of punitive 
damages. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Atkin Wright & Miles 
v. Mountain States Tel.. 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985); Maw v, Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District. 436 P.2d 230 (Utah 1968); Graham v. Street. 270 P.2d 456 (Utah 1954). 
5. Further, the evidence at trial was undisputed that Third-Party Plaintiffs had been 
damaged in the amount of $9,000.00 for the Third-Party Defendant's wrongful conversion of 
their property. Accordingly, Third-Party Plaintiffs request that the judgment against Vance also 
include the $9,000.00 damage related to the conversion of the property belonging to Wilderness 
Building Systems, Inc. Again, evidence on the issue of compensatory damages for conversion 
against Defendant Vance in the Third-Party Complaint, was presented and not refuted at the time 
of trial. Therefore, Third-Party Plaintiffs submit that the evidence supports a finding on the fifth 
cause of action against Defendant Vance for judgment in the amount of $9,800.00, plus recovery 
of the $816.00 Third-Party Plaintiffs paid to Defendant Vance to perform work related to 
collection of their accounts, which he never did. 
WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiffs respectfully request that Third-Party Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment be denied, and that the court enter judgment for compensatory 
-3-
damages against Dennis Vance consistent with those rendered against Defendants Hubble and 
Wilderness Building Systems in the amount of $24,780.56, plus $16,583.97 for a total of 
$41,364.53, plus interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) from April 21, 1993; for 
compensatory damages on Third-Party Plaintiffs conversion claim in the amount of $9,800.00; 
and for damages against Defendant Vance for his breach of the services contract and the $816.00 
paid to him for work on lot J-63. 
L 
DATED this I^J day of November, 199^  
CHRISTL :N QMNTAG 
M\ PMMMMA?) 
Lpit L.\ LnriJStiansen' / 
Jttornejr foW Third-Party Plaintiffs 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Response to Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Countermotion for Compensatory Damages was mailed, postage prepaid this 
*^ " day of November, 1994, to the following: 
Michael G. Barker, Esq. 
56 E. Broadway, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott B. Mitchell, Esq. 
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO 
An Association of Sole Proprietorships 
Kearns Building, Suite 721 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kay Gneiting 
8194 South 2470 West 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
>m li\&J 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN of 
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG 
345 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
Attorneys for Defendants Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. 
and Kerry Rick Hubble 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON W. ROBINSON and ] 
ARLENE ROBINSON, ; 
Plaintiffs, \ 
vs. 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK \ 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., ] 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendants, ] 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK ) 
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS ] 
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a ] 
Utah corporation, ] 
Third Party Plaintiffs, ] 
DENNIS VANCE, ' 
Third Party Defendant. ' 
) ORDER DENYING VANCE'S 
) MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
) JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 
) THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S 
) COUNTERMOTION FOR 
) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
l Civil No. 920902754 
) Judge Homer Wilkinson 
-1-
crs88 
Th,r j:'.i'.^i;:i;'l District 
JAN 2 4 1995 
This matter came on regularly before the Court for hearing on Third-Party Defendant 
Dennis Vance's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Third-Party Plaintiffs Countermotion for 
Compensatory Damages on January 13, 1995 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge, presiding. Kent L. Christiansen of the law 
firm of Christiansen & Sonntag, appeared on behalf of the Defendants, Wilderness Building 
Systems, Inc. and Kerry Rick Hubble. Scott B. Mitchell appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs, 
Leon W. and Arlene Robinson. Michael G. Barker appeared on behalf of Third-Party 
defendant, Dennis Vance. The parties having submitted legal Memoranda, and having filed 
various pleadings and other documents in support of their respective positions, the Court having 
reviewed the testimony and documentary exhibits presented to the Court, and the parties having 
argued the matter to the Court, the Court having considered the arguments of the parties, and 
now being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance's 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment is hereby denied; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Compensatory 
Damages against Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance is granted on the basis that the court feels 
the evidence adduced at trial, the applicable law, and the interests of justice and equity support 
entry of an order consistent with the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
the Amended Judgment filed contemporaneously herewith. 
-2-
00580 
DATED this ^ ' day of January, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
OMER F. WILKINSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying 
Vance's Motion To Set Aside Judgment And Granting Third-Party Plaintiff's Countermotion For 
Compensatory Damages by placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage 
prepaid, this f*> day of January, 1995, and properly addressed as follows: 
Scott B. Mitchell 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 620 
8 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael G. Barker 
Attorney at Law 
56 E. Broadway, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FM '- W 
00O00 
Kay Gneiting; Kerry Rick 
Hubble; and Wilderness 
Building Systems, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellees, 
Dennis Blaine Vance, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellant. 
COURT OF- M^EMLS 
ORDER 
Case No. 950342-CA 
This matter is before the court upon a motion for 
enlargement of time, filed on August 8, 1995, by Lawrence R. 
Dingivan and Jeffrey Weston Shields of the law firm of Purser 
Edwards & Shields, L.L.C., allegedly in behalf of appellant. 
Appellees filed an objection to the motion on August 10, 1995. 
The motion for enlargement of time alleges that additional 
time is needed to file appellant's brief because the transcript 
is not completed. Despite, Mr. Dingivan's representation that 
the transcript has been requested, this court has not received a 
copy of such request as required under Rule 11(e)(1), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, nor has the court reporter filed an 
acknowledgment of the request as required under Rule 12(a)(1), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The court questions the authority of counsel to file the 
motion for enlargement since they have not been retained by 
appellant to represent him in the appeal. Additionally, the 
court is concerned with appellant's consistent failure to comply 
with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in 
pursuing this appeal. 
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for 
enlargement of time is denied. 
Dated t h i s jsh day of August, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August, 1995, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
Dennis Blaine Vance 
7702 West 13090 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Kent L* Christiansen 
Christiansen & Sonntag 
Attorneys at Law 
4 20 East South Temple, #34 5 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 18th day of August, 1995, 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 950342 
EXHIBIT "F" 
Rule 60, Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mis takes . Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
darts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
iny party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
jnay be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
\ (b) Mistakes; inadver tence ; excusab le neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
fe the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
14) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
Served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
(siled to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
betn satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
Justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
^within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
ffconths after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
^notion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
j*iapend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
lain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
^Obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
tales or by an independent action. 
